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Abstract 
The capacity of building services in many hospitals exceeds the requirements by significant amounts. 
Oversizing of building services has a direct impact on building efficiency and operational costs, 
ultimately impacting upon patient care, by diverting much needed funding. A key factor leading to the 
oversizing is the excessive and uncoordinated application of design margins across various project 
stages. Based on a hospital case study, this paper analyses the reasons for the overdesign of a 
replacement cooling system and raises the importance of managing margins activity to avoid overdesign. 
Keywords: design process, decision making, energy efficiency, overdesign 
1. Introduction 
Overdesign of critical building service systems increases purchasing and running costs, as well as 
carbon emissions. Building on previous research undertaken by the authors, this paper looks at design 
margins and the apparent overcapacity of building services within hospitals (Jones and Eckert, 2016, 
2017, 2018, 2019). Through an in-depth hospital case study, this paper analyses the overdesign of a 
new replacement chilled water system within a large National Health Service (NHS) teaching hospital, 
and the circumstances that led to this, in particular the lack of systematic management of current and 
future requirements. It raises the importance of margins as a hidden source of excess cost and energy 
consumption and proposes that the application of margins within building services, need to be 
managed activity. Based on the research findings, a number of mitigation factors that may help to 
prevent future overdesign of hospital building service systems, are set out and discussed. 
The capacity of building services often exceeds the requirements by significant amounts (Peeters et al., 
2008; Djunaedy et al., 2011; Bacon, 2014; Jones and Eckert, 2016). Oversizing of building services has a 
direct impact on building efficiency, capital expenditure, maintenance and operational costs, as well as 
environmental and societal impacts throughout its lifecycle. In hospitals this directly impacts upon patient 
care, by diverting much needed funding. A key factor leading to the oversizing is the excessive and 
uncoordinated application of design margins (i.e. the amount by which a parameter value exceeds its 
requirements) across the specification, design and installation, project stages. A prior case study (Jones and 
Eckert, 2018, 2019) looked at a boiler house, that was oversized by more than 400% against current 
requirements, backed up using multiple systems to provide redundancy in the event of component failure 
and had an increased annual running costs of 100,000s of pounds. Planned overcapacity during the 
specification stage may be considered necessary to allow for future expansion, whereas, overcapacity 
during the design and installation stages could be seen to provide flexibility, resilience, safety and 
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functionality. Overcapacity is often justified in the name of resilience. Hospitals are obliged to be resilient 
and maintain their core functionality, even in adverse circumstances. Apart from the obvious efficiency 
limitations of oversizing, whereby systems are incapable of operating at an optimum point (Peeters et al., 
2008; Djunaedy et al., 2011), oversized systems also result in higher than necessary energy consumption 
and operating costs; this ultimately detracts funds from clinical services. This raises the question how 
systems come to be so oversized. Systems are often designed on a ‘like-for-like’ basis, replacing old 
oversized systems with more efficient but equally oversized systems, without conducting proper life cycle 
analysis, because the hospital feels confident that the system meets its need. Other contributing factors to 
oversizing include a lack of communication and transparency across the various project stakeholder groups, 
including NHS Trusts, private finance providers and building contractors/installers, and the reliance on 
‘rule of thumb’ assumptions and imperfect building data to define initial project specifications (Bownass, 
2001; Bacon, 2014). Energy Performance Contracting provides a private sector ‘funding mechanism’ 
branded a private finance initiative (PFI) for hospitals to procure large infrastructure systems such as new 
boilers, chillers (for the generation of cold water) or combined heat and power (CHP) systems (Jones et al., 
2018). A number of commercial organisations operate Energy Performance Contracts (EPC’s) offering 
capital finance for building services infrastructure and associated guaranteed energy savings compared to 
the old systems they replace (Lee et al., 2015). This leads to substantial long-term financial burdens (de 
Neufville et al., 2004) and missed opportunities from an energy efficiency perspective. 
The in-depth case study informing this paper is one such EPC project. In addition to the case study, 
the research involved the participation of five NHS hospital Trusts that collaborated across two 
workshop meetings to discuss the issue of design margins within building services and the wider issue 
of oversizing. Representatives of the Chartered Institute of Building Service Engineers (CIBSE) and 
NHS Improvement (NHSI) were also interviewed to gain both; industry, and health sector insights and 
the implications of the oversizing problem. The paper highlights both primary and secondary factors 
responsible for the chilled water system overdesign. Background literature relating to overdesign and 
resilience is presented in section two, the research methodology is presented in section three, and an 
explanation of how the system became oversized is detailed in section four. Lost rationale for the 
project is presented in section five. Discussion points, contributions and mitigation strategies are 
reflected upon in section five, and conclusions are drawn in section six. 
2. Overdesign and resilience 
Overdesign of a system implies that there is system excess that can be quantified by looking at system 
margins. A useful definition of a design margin is: “the extent to which a parameter value exceeds 
what it needs to meet its functional requirements regardless of the motivation for which the margin 
was included” (Eckert et al., 2013). The term ‘margin’ is often used within companies in a number of 
industry sectors, particularly in the aerospace or ship-building industry (Stratmann, 2006). In the 
context of ship-building, margins and overdesign are seen as excess “the quantity of surplus in a 
system once the necessities of the system are met” and as capacity “the ability of a system to meet 
future performance objectives using existing system excess” (Tackett et al., 2014). In the context of 
mechanical engineering, design margins are added to provide flexibility; flexibility itself being defined 
as providing “functionality, performance, and capacity” each of which can be thought of as 
“requirements” (Banerjee and de Weck, 2004). Flexibility can help ‘future proof’ the design of a 
product, however, this will inevitably introduce a degree of overdesign (Ross and Hastings, 2005). 
Although attributes such as flexibility and future-proofing resulting from the inclusion of margins in 
engineering design are also relevant in building services design, margins applied in building services 
engineering are primarily applied to safeguard against uncertainty and risk (CIBSE, 2006); this 
practice, however, often leads to inefficient oversized solutions. Some of the most significant margins 
applied within building services design are to ensure resilience and reliability on two related levels: 
 resilience is provided by maintaining specific operating conditions by assuring the building 
functions within specified parameters 
 resilience of the overall system ensures core functions are maintained, i.e. to provide adequate 
medical care (Dieter, 1989). 
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Resilient systems may include several approaches to service provision, these can include; the 
operation of standby generators using different fuels, the provision of redundancy or spare capacity 
within building service systems, or the use of experienced, appropriately trained personnel to act 
competently, in the case of an emergency (Jones and Eckert, 2019). Alternative systems may also be 
considered to provide resilience rather than using the traditional like-for-like redundancy strategies, 
e.g. using localised DX refrigeration plant as backup rather than ‘doubling up’ on large centralised 
cooling systems (Oughton and Wilson, 2015). 
2.1. Redundancy to assure operational resilience 
Hospital building service systems are designed to continue to operate in the event of system failure, this 
sustained resilience is achieved through the implementation of redundancy design principles 
(International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986). Redundancy factors ensure reliability in the event of a full 
and partial system failure (Chen and Crilly, 2014). Having more chiller units than is necessary to meet 
the building maximum demand is an example of system redundancy. The degree of redundancy applied 
is dependent upon a building’s risk and resilience requirements, hospitals typically work on the basis of 
an N+1 redundancy strategy, i.e. the redundancy of a single chiller (N) is substituted by a chiller of 
matched capacity (+1). Typically, redundancy scenarios utilise building service systems on a like-for-
like basis. The closely related concepts of segregation; which provides resilience on the basis that total 
system failure is less likely if its component parts are located physically away from each other, and 
diversity; which provides resilience on the basis that different system types are used to provide a 
common function, are other alternative strategies (  ller and  ansson,     ). The application of a 
modular architecture, e.g. the installation of six small chillers each with an operating capacity of 100kW, 
rather than operating two large 300kW chillers, is likely to provide a number of operating efficiency and 
life-cycle cost benefits as the building cooling needs can be more closely matched to demand, across all 
four seasons. These benefits, however, may be counteracted by the likely increase in capital expenditure 
for the modular system due to the need for a greater number of components and increased installation 
and commissioning costs, thus posing an interesting dilemma for building owners and designers, over 
whether to opt for higher life-cycle operating costs or increased capital costs. 
2.2. Margins leading to overdesign 
One of the reasons for overdesign is the large range of margin values that are quoted within building 
services design guides, with very little published support on their definitive use, leaving design 
engineers to decide how to apply the margins, based on their previous experience (Jones et al., 2018). 
The little guidance that has been published tends to be through the promotion of better design 
consistency and standards (Race, 2007), however, it would seem from a number of building service 
engineering case studies (Crozier, 2000; Jones and Eckert, 2016) and the authors professional practice 
of 30 years working within the building services industry, that this guidance is largely being ignored 
and that the practice of applying excessive margins continues to be accepted. A Building Services 
Research and Information Association (BSRIA) guide to building services calculations states that 
“margins should never be added during a calculation process without an adequate reason for doing 
so and with the approval of a senior engineer” furthermore “if any margins are used they should be 
clearly identified and a justification given for their use” (BSRIA, 2007). 
Other factors leading to overdesign in building services is poor communication between project 
stakeholders (i.e. clients, designers and installers) whereby assumptions, estimates and contingency 
margins applied, are not shared (Jones and Eckert, 2019), in addition, it is common practice for 
engineering design consultants to apply ‘precautionary margins’ to offset any potential liability or 
financial penalties that may be imposed on them, as a result of not meeting the necessary requirements. 
It is therefore safe to assume that there are opportunities within the specification, design and installation 
process to carefully apply margins that lead to a robust solution, whilst avoiding overdesign. 
The absence of good quality data (i.e. data relating to energy and thermal requirements) on which to 
base engineering designs, is another contributing factor to the oversizing issue that leads to many 
estimates and assumptions being made, and hence the prolific application of cumulative margins, by 
various stakeholders, to safeguard against any uncertainties or risks (Bacon, 2014). 
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3. Methodology 
The research of this paper is based on a case study carried out as part of a Centre for Digital Built 
Britain (CDBB) funded study. It adopted a mixed methods approach that included; semi-structured 
interviews, document analysis, modelling of the case study engineering system including a stakeholder 
analysis, and participant workshops. The project included five NHS hospital organisations as 
collaborators who were invited to a launch workshop which provided a general introduction to design 
margins and how the cumulation of these might lead to the oversizing of building service systems. 
Each of the partners recognised the issues presented and offered suggestions for building service 
projects carried out within their hospital organisation, that could be studied. The particular hospital 
selected for the case study, was a high-profile case well known in NHS hospital circles as a successful 
PFI and EPC project; however, the Estates Director felt that while making remarkable savings 
compared to its 1980s predecessor, the system was seriously oversized. 
3.1. The approach to the hospital case study 
The hospital case study included semi-structured interviews with a range of decision-makers, 
designers and project managers involved in both phases of the CHP, boiler and chiller replacement 
EPC works. Interviews in respect to this project took place between 15th February 2019 and 10th May 
2019. The researchers developed a set of questions before each interview, but ran the interviews as 
freely flowing conversations to allow the interviewees to explain their role and influences within the 
building services infrastructure design. Ensuring participants’ anonymity also provided space for them 
to talk frankly, particularly where organisational and project constraints were perceived to negatively 
affect the decision-making process. Five interviews were conducted with six participants (P1 to P6) 
who were either currently running the hospital, or had been involved at the time of procurement. 
Two further, related interviews were organised with experts outside the immediate project. P7 to 
provide a wider view of the oversizing issue within the building services industry and how best to 
mitigate against this. P8 thought to gain an NHS overview of the problem and how best to provide 
NHS managers with the necessary tools to ensure that oversizing of plant and equipment doesn’t 
impact on hospital energy performance and costs, going forward. All interviews were conducted face-
to-face by the first author and at least one other author; notes were also taken, capturing the salient 
points discussed. The interviews provided some useful detail regarding the EPC infrastructure project, 
highlighting key stakeholders, capital and funding challenges, design influences and processes, 
limitations in energy data, project constraints and subsequent operation and performance of the 
building service systems installed. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed following a 
thematic analysis approach. A list of interviewees are provided in chronological order in Table 1. 
Table 1. List of interviewees, in chronological order 
Interview 
no. 
Name and Job Title Date Duration Interviewer 
P1 Estates Operational Manager 15/02/2019 94 minutes DJ, CE, PG 
P2 + P3 Senior Operational Estates Manager and Director 
of Estates and Facilities 
15/02/2019 68 minutes DJ, CE, PG 
P4 Technical Director - Contracting Company 05/04/2019 69 minutes DJ, CE, PG 
P5 Director of Estates & Facilities (at the project 
funding and initiation stage) 
02/05/2019 81 minutes DJ, CE, PG 
P6 Regional Director - EPC Main Contractor 10/05/2019 64 minutes DJ, CE, PG 
P7 Head of CIBSE Certification 22/05/2019 41 minutes DJ, CE, PG 
P8 NHSI National Sustainability Lead 04/06/2019 58 minutes DJ, CE 
In addition to the research interviews, a project document review was also undertaken. The focus of 
the document review was to determine information such as; the project specification, project timelines, 
design considerations, decision processes and the funding options considered; system performance 
post installation and installed capacities were also explored. Six key documents were reviewed which 
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included; site plans and mechanical service drawings, cost information, project scope and technical 
specifications and post installation operational performance data. The review was carried out using 
key ‘word’ searches relative to the areas of interest via a programme toolbar, within a pdf reader. 
Based on information derived from the interviews and the document review, the authors were able to 
model the project stakeholders, their roles and influences. In addition, a detailed engineering systems 
model was developed illustrating the previous system installation alongside the new project 
installation. Engineering calculations were undertaken based on this model to establish the current 
system performance relative to the previous system. The outcomes of the study were presented back to 
the project representatives and other NHS research participants. 
4. How the system became oversized 
The reasons for the overdesign in the system fall into two major categories: the way in which funding 
can be procured for capital expenditure projects biases hospital management towards building large 
systems, when they have the opportunity; and the design decisions taken in a specific project based on 
unclear demand, which will be discussed in the following section. The paper argues the need for 
hospital organisations to fully examine the needs, costs and procurement options of capital 
infrastructure projects before entering into long-term EPC contracts requiring significant financial 
commitment, through better life-cycle cost analysis and the planning of future needs. But also, the 
need to improve; energy data capture and analysis, design processes, and the communications and 
training of project stakeholders, enabling hospital managers to make more informed decisions and 
reduce the probability of oversizing. 
The recognition for the need to tackle hospital infrastructure issues first arose in 2010. After obtaining 
the necessary internal Board commitment and approvals, the hospital organisation engaged their 
preferred framework providers to undertake an initial feasibility study in 2012. A procurement process 
ran across 2013/14 with the development of a specification proforma, a call for tender, and the selection 
and sign-off of the preferred EPC supplier in 2015 by the hospital Board. The project finished in 2018. 
4.1. Capital expenditure in the NHS 
Capital expenditure, often termed CapEx (i.e. funds used by an organisation to acquire, upgrade, and 
maintain physical assets such as property, buildings, technology and equipment) within hospitals is 
currently heavily restricted due to finite resources, unpredictable Government funding mechanisms 
and competition alongside other public sector organisations. Even when CapEx does become available 
to a hospital organisation, these finances are also linked to medical equipment budgets, which are 
often prioritised as the organisations core business; moreover, very often hospital Estates Directors are 
not represented on Trust Boards, and therefore are unable to secure funding for anything other than 
urgent reactive works and catastrophic equipment failure, leaving the opportunity to proactively 
replace aged building services infrastructure; a rare exception (P3). Borrowing on the open market is 
also difficult for NHS hospital organisations, as this is subject to internal borrowing limits, outline and 
full business case approval and the need to meet NHSI and Treasury requirements, all of which can 
take many months and significant costs to obtain. Once borrowing is approved, an EPC can provide an 
attractive mechanism by which borrowed CapEx is repaid (P8). The hospital had significant historic 
backlog maintenance issues, mainly running on emergence maintenance and was concerned about 
catastrophic breakdown of the aged infrastructure, leaving the hospital with no heating or cooling. The 
hospital Estates Director remarked “during that year we did have failure of the existing kit and had to 
bring in packaged plant; and that was at huge expense” (P3). The hospital capitalised from the ‘one-
time’ funding opportunity and used an EPC to provide private finance that facilitated the replacement 
of old, inefficient energy infrastructure such as large boiler systems and chiller replacements. It was 
funded through the revenue of energy savings via a ‘guaranteed savings’ scheme, against the 
performance of the old system. The works were undertaken across two distinct phases: 
 Phase 1 (2016/2017) - The installation of a 4.3MWe combined heat and power unit, a waste 
heat combination boiler, a single absorption chiller, heating and chilled water pump systems, 
heating and domestic hot water (DHW) plate heat exchangers and LED lighting upgrades (to 
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improve the overall project ‘return on investment’ (ROI); the Phase 1 works also included an 
innovative 1.6km hospital-to-hospital energy (hot water) and power link. 
 Phase 2 (2017/2018) - The installation of a further two chiller units (one electric and one 
absorption chiller) and a number of roof mounted heat rejection units (adiabatic radiators). 
The project was scoped beyond the hospital boundaries to include the installation of district heating linkage 
points for future connection to neighbouring university and residential buildings, enabling a staple income 
stream to be generated by the hospital organisation via the trading of residual heat (P5). Despite the 
connection points being in place, this opportunity has yet to be realised. The total cost of the entire project was 
understood to be just short of £50M; the finance borrowing limit over which requires UK Treasury approval. 
When appraising the costs of the chiller overdesign from data provided, the CHP and absorption chiller 
combination relative to the Phase 1 works reduced chilled water generation costs from £70k to £14 P.A., 
providing a good financial outcome compared to the original system. Installation of the Phase 2 chillers, 
however, only reduced chilled water generation costs by a further £8k to £6k P.A. When considering the 
Phase 2 capital expenditure of £2.6m, it is clear that the Phase 2 project did not provide a good return on 
investment. The research findings, however, revealed that nobody within the hospital organisation had a 
full overview or understanding of the project economics and ROI. Preliminary calculations suggest that 
alternative systems may have provided overall ‘greater value for money’. 
Poor baseline data can also have a negative impact on EPC shared savings schemes due to the hospital 
organisation choosing to ‘err on the side of caution’ with regard to the client specification and hence 
over-estimate base-line energy demand figures to ensure equipment installed via the EPC, is not 
undersized (P6). NHS hospitals have notoriously poor energy and thermal metering infrastructure; 
data relating to hospital service flow temperatures and space and environmental conditions are also, 
very often, not available (P4 and P6). The absence of reliable data upon which to appropriately size 
building services plant and equipment results in uncertainties that lead to the use of ‘rules of thumb’ 
estimates and sizing tools on which to base site thermal capacity requirements of boiler and chiller 
plant. Even when reliable data is available, due to a skills shortage, attracting energy managers skilled 
in data analysis and energy forecasting is difficult, leaving the data under-utilised (P8). Unfortunately, 
because the same client specification is used to set shared savings targets, there is a potential issue 
whereby savings claimed by the EPC provider may be greater than the actual savings realised. 
5. The lost rationale 
The case study of this paper specifically focuses on Phase 2 of the EPC works; the installation of 
supplementary chiller plant and associated adiabatic heat rejection units. The system has multiple 
chillers using different solution principles. Prior to the upgrade works, there were no meters measuring 
the energy input or energy output to/from the hospital chillers, therefore it was not possible to 
definitively state the chilled water demand (P6). 
The hospital organisation requirements specification requested that the chilled water upgrade works 
provide for an N+1 chilled water supply capacity of 2.5MW; this brief was the basis of designing the 
chiller upgrade which informed the ‘Phase  ’ works. Calculations and observations undertaken by the EPC 
main contractor suggest a summer (peak) cooling demand of 900kW was appropriate. An uplift of 20% 
was applied to offset errors in the calculation methodology increasing the summer chilled water demand to 
1,080kW (circa 1MW), hence, the new Phase 1 absorption chiller rated at 1.16MW capacity, was of 
sufficient duty to meet the chilling requirement of the site. The discrepancy between the specification 
(brief) and calculated cooling requirement was brought to the attention of the hospital organisation for 
review, however, a decision was made by hospital managers to stay with the 2.5MW specification. As a 
result, the Phase 2 chiller project increased the installed chilled water capacity by a further 2.6MW (1 x 
1MW absorption chiller + 1 x 1.6MW electric chiller), providing total chilled water generation capacity of 
3.76MW; a system that is 276% over and above the calculated peak capacity of the site. In addition, seven 
x 1 W packaged heat rejection units were installed as part of the ‘Phase  ’ works, a heat rejection 
capability of 600% over and above the anticipated heat rejection needs of the site. Secondary chilled water 
systems, such as pumps, valves and pipework are required to accommodate the maximum load capability 
of the main chiller plant, consequently the margins of overdesign on the secondary systems can also be 
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considerable. Figure 1 provides a model overview of the original hospital systems installed in the 19  ’s 
alongside Phase 1 (in green) and Phase 2 (in blue) systems; original systems removed are also illustrated. 
 
Figure 1. Modelling of the original and current hospital installations 
Whilst the heating system components of the Phase 1 works (i.e. CHP, combi boiler and heat/power 
link) are illustrated along with the original standby steam boilers, these are included for completeness 
only to provide a full overview of the hospital systems. The components of the Phase 2 works (i.e. 
chiller No.1 and chiller No.3, circulation pumps and heat rejection radiators) and the absorption chiller 
No.2 of Phase 1, were the main focus of the study. Blue directional lines illustrate flow and return 
chilled water distribution, whilst the red directional lines represent flow and return heat rejection 
pipework. 
The project has resolved significant backlog maintenance issues for the hospital organisation and 
overall, due to the Phase 1 works only, delivers considerable energy savings so that the obvious 
overdesign issue of the Phase 2 chiller system has been overlooked. Current employees of the hospital 
organisation were not aware of the rationale behind the Phase 2 specification that was sent out to 
tender. Nor were they aware of the design rationale for the project, and this became apparent when the 
commissioning Estates Director who had left the hospital organisation several years before completion 
of the new systems, was interviewed (P5). Whilst the system capacity was considered at the outset of 
the design, it appeared that as long as the new system continued to produce significant savings, the 
considerable oversizing was not questioned. This is particularly worrying considering the urgent need 
to reduce CO2 emissions, and cut costs within NHS hospitals. 
The project was implemented and run by three groups of stakeholders; see Figure 2. The Contracting 
Company has an overseeing role of the Main EPC Contractor. They interact with the hospital through 
monthly project meetings. The organisations had a range of participating project stakeholders, ranging 
from hospital managers and contracted technical personnel, through to local residents. The hospital 
organisation has been subjected to a significant turnover of personnel, in particular, senior management. 
This led to a lack of visibility across the hierarchy of the organisation and a loss of rationale for basic 
decisions made. Assumptions applied to the Phase 2 design specification, relating to data supporting 
hospital capacity requirements, target use, future growth predictions and future energy demands have 
inevitably been lost over time, as key personnel have left the organisation. It would also appear that the 
scope and ambition of opportunities envisaged at project design stage, such as an extension of the current 
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heat network; interconnecting university buildings and local residences, have been forgotten. Hence, the 
EPC main contractor and the contracting company have been instrumental in maintaining continuity of 
the project. However, they are not party to strategic planning at the hospital. 
 
Figure 2. Scope of project stakeholders 
The stakeholders’ motivation for the project varies significantly. For the hospital organisation it 
reduces backlog maintenance “the funding scheme enabled me to radically change what was a 
completely broken infrastructure” (P5), provides ease of maintenance (delivered via the EPC contract) 
“Effectively, these schemes are really about risk management, passing the risk over to the contractor 
as much as possible” (P5), improves resilience, supports growth of site energy demands, and saves 
money through the EPC. For the EPC provider and the contracting company the project brings a long 
term contract, good reputation and publicity, and a share in energy savings. 
6. Discussion 
Replacement of building services equipment in a hospital environment competes with medical 
equipment, in the same budget, and therefore its purchase is often deferred or abandoned. Adding to 
this, Estates Directors are not generally represented on hospital Boards, so it can be difficult to gain 
capital funding. It can also be challenging for hospital organisations to borrow on the open market, so 
privately financed EPC schemes are an attractive solution; this however presents a bias towards ‘one-
time’ large projects, rather than incremental system updates, as the need arises. NHS hospitals must 
therefore consider the long term financial commitment that large EPC contracts require. 
One of the key findings of the study identifies that, to focus purely on savings as a measure of project 
success, can hide very significant overdesign, particularly when based on a comparison of the new 
system against the older exceedingly inefficient solution. Multiple solutions may have provided 
savings, but there was little effort to determine if the chosen design was the most appropriate for the 
task. When an older systems is replaced, the new system tends to inherit any degree of the oversizing 
of the original, and this effect can be hidden by the savings due to improved plant efficiency. 
Theoretically each item of equipment should be scrutinised for its need and capacity, and whether it 
uses too much energy. The study highlighted a lack of clear data on temperature flows, sub system 
energy use and environmental data; data was available for the whole hospital site and major buildings, 
but many sub systems were not metered, this led to the formulation of assumptions of current use, 
rather than using real data. A lack of forward planning for future needs particularly for plant and 
equipment was also apparent, cooling and heating needs for the hospital were highly uncertain, whereas 
scenario planning ought to be possible. Rationale for basic sizing decisions were not captured in a form 
retrievable by the hospital organisation due to a high turnover of personnel; poor communications and 
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vague documentation also added to the issue bringing into question the need for better traceability and 
data capture. Explanations for the system oversizing were generally attributed to the need for redundancy 
and resilience, this is despite the opportunity to replace like-for-like scenarios, with innovative 
alternative solutions. 
There are a number of mitigation strategies that could be adopted to avoid overdesign in future projects; 
these can be considered under the four main headings of; information, design, processes and people. 
Information and data is important on various levels to capture the scope and rationale of margins used, 
and to better understand building energy trend profiles. Improved data collection from site and a more 
thorough understanding of margins added by suppliers is likely to improve design outcomes; this 
information could be a requirement of the contract award. Monitoring the energy consummation of 
medical equipment and buildings though additional metering, logging equipment and energy flow 
profiles are therefore important measures in tackling the oversizing issue. 
From a design perspective, considering a modular architecture may result in higher upfront costs, 
however, these systems are likely to provide beneficial whole life-cycle cost outcomes, through 
improved long-term operating efficiencies. Designing like-for-like replacement systems that are based 
on the capacities of old inefficient systems, should also be avoided. Challenging redundancy at system 
architecture level and considering the use of alternative systems, or systems that can provide back-up 
from outside the hospital system, e.g. via a heat network from a neighbouring organisation, may help 
to reduce standing energy losses associated with traditional N+1 systems. Avoiding cumulative 
margins within engineering calculations through better stakeholder communications and transparency, 
and using an options approach to design, i.e. plan the infrastructure for a larger system, but don’t 
install all units, are other important considerations. 
Various processes may be adopted to reduce the risk of oversizing; failure mode analysis, risk 
analysis, periodic sensitivity analysis, are all examples of these. Agreeing a ‘set’ level of overall 
margins to provide sufficient resilience, is another option. Processes and systems that support the 
optimisation of the initial design, but also the ongoing ‘in use’ performance of the system, should also 
be adopted. Mitigation through people interventions may be effective. Having a dedicated system 
architect to oversee the life-cycle of project from specification through to commissioning could 
provide a robust solution to the problem. Improving communications between project stakeholders 
groups is also a key requirement. Not all Estates Managers are aware of the efficiencies of their own 
or proposed equipment, improved training and education will ensure that personnel are better 
informed, enabling them to challenge design consultants, before final decisions are made. 
7. Conclusions 
A starting point for this project was the hypothesis that overdesign leads to energy waste. However, 
many of the findings from the project, in terms of a lack of understanding of the requirements and the 
risks, apply equally to undersized systems. The principle cause of the chiller overdesign was due to the 
hospital organisations output specification, where no rationale for this was obtained. To avoid similar 
overdesign in the future it is important to understand how margins have arisen. The case study and 
discussions with hospital building service experts have confirmed that overdesign of building services is 
a real problem, and that sizing building systems appropriately has the potential of reducing energy 
consumption and costs considerably. The study has revealed that hospitals are missing clear procedures 
to capture the current and future energy needs and to assess surplus capacity required for resilience; this 
makes measuring and tracking margins difficult. 
The development of appropriate methods to quantitatively assess acceptable levels of overdesign necessary 
for resilience, together with the creation of a model to avoid overdesign resulting from cumulative margins 
and other contributing factors, both within, and outside the design process, are therefore important areas of 
further work. The immediate impact of the project lies in the awareness of overdesign that has been raised 
amongst the participating hospital organisations and the companies involved. The potential impact, 
however, goes far beyond this project to include other building types, and a transferability to other products 
and sectors, such as the automotive and aerospace industries. The authors believe that the case study 
highlights a much wider problem of great significance; the language of achieving ‘savings’ from projects, 
with regards to specified base lines, hides potential perpetual overdesign. 
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